This paper analyzes how the liquidity coinsurance provided by interbank markets a¤ects the incentives to raise bank capital. Following Gale (2004) , bank capital is considered as a bu¤er to shield deposits from banks'liquidity shocks and then it represents an additional (costly) source of liquidity insurance. Hence, bank capital and interbank markets are to a certain extent substitutes, and we characterize the conditions under which a negative relationship exists between the level of bank capital and the level of participation in the interbank markets. Moreover, we argue that in order to smooth liquidity shocks banks tend to postpone dividend payments when the interbank market is unable to provide additional liquidity because of highly correlated shocks throughout the economy. This mechanism produces three implications: i) an inverse relationship between bank capital changes and participation in interbank markets; ii) an inverse relationship between dividend changes and participation in interbank markets; iii) a positive relationship between the level of dividends and participation in interbank markets. All these relationships …nd strong support in the data. JEL Classi…cation: G21.
Introduction
This paper analyzes how the liquidity coinsurance provided by interbank markets a¤ects the incentives to raise bank capital. Most of the banking literature provides a theoretical justi…cation for bank capital on two grounds. On the one hand, capital serves to curb incentives to take excessive risk by highly leveraged …nancial institutions. On the other hand, capital provides a cushion for a shortfall in asset values in the event of bankruptcy. (See, e.g., Kim and Santomero [19] , Furlong and Keeley [14] , Gennotte and Pyle [16] , Rochet [21] and Besanko and Kanatas [5] ).
Alternatively, Gale [15] argues that bank capital also has a risk-sharing function. He presents a model of capital as a bu¤er stock, in which the optimal capital structure improves risk-sharing between shareholders and depositors. Similarly to Gale [15] , we focus on the risk-sharing role of bank capital. However, we closely analyze the e¤ect of the participation in interbank markets in determining bank capital. The emphasis on the relationship between bank capital and participation in interbank market arises naturally given that, at least in principle, interbank markets reduce the scope for bank capital as a risk-sharing device.
We model a two-region economy, in which each region is populated by risk-adverse depositors and risk-neutral investors. While the former deposit their endowment in banks, the latter provide bank capital. Banks acting on behalf of depositors have two investment opportunities: a short-term liquid asset (storage technology) and a long-term illiquid asset. Each region has uncertain liquidity needs characterized by a regional liquidity shock. The existence of an interbank deposit market allows banks in di¤erent regions to coinsure when regional liquidity shocks are negatively correlated. However, interbank markets are of little help when liquidity shocks are positively correlated. Therefore, some residual aggregate uncertainty remains.
The presence of aggregate uncertainty gives a scope for the use of bank capital as a risk-sharing device. That is, some of the undiversi…able risk can be transferred (at a cost) to risk-neutral investors. In a world without aggregate uncertainty the interbank market would be su¢ cient to deal with idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and there would be no need for bank capital. It follows that a reduction in aggregate uncertainty should imply a reduction in bank capital as well. This is indeed the case for certain parameters values but, surprisingly, it is not a general property of the model. This is due to the fact that a reduction in aggregate uncertainty implies also a reallocation in the investment decisions of the banks. In particular, when aggregate uncertainty reduces banks have an incentive to reduce the investment in the liquid asset and, as in Castiglionesi et.al. [6] , this can cause a higher consumption volatility. Bank capital in this case is valuable since it helps in moderating such volatility. Given that higher aggregate uncertainty implies lower interbank market participation, the model predicts a negative relationship between interbank market participation and bank capital only insofar bank capital is increasing in aggregate uncertainty.
Furthermore, banks collect a capital bu¤er to transfer part of the aggregate uncertainty to the risk-neutral investors. In our model, this is achieved by paying a dividend which is contingent on aggregate liquidity needs. In particular, when aggregate liquidity needs are high throughout the economy, it is optimal to postpone dividend payments. Given that in this case the interbank market is unable to provide additional liquidity, at the same time that banks postpone dividends they also tend to have smaller positions vis-a-vis other banks. This mechanism should produce a positive relationship between dividend payments and participation in the interbank market, as measured for example by the magnitude of the interbank net position, which is possible to validate empirically.
The model also predicts a negative relationship between current and future dividends so that when interbank market participation is low, current dividends are also low but future dividends tend to be high. This means that there exists a negative relationship between interbank market participation and changes in dividend payments, i.e., dividends tend to increase over time when interbank participation is low.
Finally, dividend payments also a¤ect the value of bank capital. Namely, the payment of current dividends tends to reduce capital, both for an accounting reason and, within this framework, also because it signals lower dividends in the future. The postponement of a dividend instead signals higher future payouts to shareholders, and the value of bank capital should increase as a consequence. Since dividends are paid (postponed) when the participation in the interbank market is high (low), the model also delivers the testable prediction of a negative relationship between changes in bank capital and participation in the interbank market.
In the second part of the paper we test the empirical implications of our theoretical model. The main variable we are interested in is bank participation in the interbank markets. Unfortunately, the interbank market is an over the counter market and the participation by banks in such market is not publicly available. A database that provides a proxy for the level of participation in this market is Bankscope that contains information on the amount a bank lends to and borrows from other banks. We select relatively large banks with total assets greater than $1 billions (book value) from the EU, UK and Japan for the period of 2005-08.
Our empirical approach consists of two steps. We …rst investigate the empirical rela-tionship between the interbank market position and the level of bank capital. Beside bank capital, we also use other independent variables controlling for factors that could in ‡u-ence the exposure of a bank in the interbank market. We …nd a negative and signi…cant relationship between interbank markets position and bank capital. In the second step, we use the …tted values of the …rst regression as independent variable and we …nd strong support for the theoretical predictions of our model. In particular, we …nd a negative and signi…cant relationship between changes in bank capital and interbank position. Similarly we …nd a negative and signi…cant relationship between changes in dividend and interbank market participation. Finally, we …nd a positive and signi…cant relationship between the level of dividends and the interbank markets position. Our paper is clearly related to both theoretical and empirical works in banking. On the theory side, the paper closer to our is the one by Gale [15] . Contrary to him, we do not focus on the regulatory aspect of bank capital instead we analyze the potential substitution e¤ect between the liquidity insurance provided by interbank markets and the insurance provided by bank capital. Similarly to Allen and Gale [3] we model interbank market as a device to decentralize the social planner solution. However, we consider aggregate uncertainty perfectly anticipated by economic agents (following Castiglionesi et al. [6] ). 1 On the empirical side, our paper relates to two strands of the literature: the one on bank capital and the other on the interbank market. Flannery and Rangan [10] and Gropp and Heider [17] look at the determinants of banks'capital holding. Flannery and Rangan [10] argue that the main cause of capital build-up of large U.S. banks in the 1990s was increased market discipline due to legislative and regulatory changes resulting in the withdrawal of implicit government guarantees. Gropp and Heider [17] test the determinants of bank capital structure and address the questions of whether these determinants di¤er from those of non-…nancial …rms. While they do not …nd evidence on the di¤erences, they argue that the most important determinant of banks'capital structure is unobserved time-invariant bank …xed e¤ects. Moreover, deposit insurance and capital regulation do not seem to have a signi…cant impact on banks'capital structure.
Regarding the interbank market, Fur…ne ([11] , [12] and [13] ) analyzes banks'screening and monitoring activity in the fed funds market, and the behaviour of this market during Russia' sovereign default. Cocco et al. [7] look at the importance of relationships as an 1 There is an extensive literature on capital regulation. Among the recent contributions, Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz [?] show the perverse e¤ect of capital requirement regulation since it reduces gambling incentives by putting bank equity at risk, however, it also harms banks'franchise values thus encouraging gambling. Diamond and Rajan [9] rationalize bank capital as the trade o¤ between liquidity creation, costs of bank distress and the ability to force borrower repayments. Allen, Carletti and Marquez [2] analyze the role of market discipline as a rationale to hold bank capital. important determinant of banks' ability to access the Portugese interbank market. In a recent contribution, Afonso et al. [1] examine the impact of the …nancial crisis of 2008, speci…cally the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, on the functioning of the federal funds market. It is argued that while banks became more restrictive in which counterparties they lent to, the …nancial crisis did not lead to a complete collapse of the fed funds market. The novelty of our approach is to look at the co-determination of banks'capital holding and their interbank market participation. To our knowledge this topic has not been explicitly addressed in the empirical literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the optimal risk-sharing allocation chosen by a social planner. Section 4 shows how the e¤cient allocation can be decentralized by the presence of interbank markets. Section 5 characterizes further the e¢ cient allocation and it analyzes how the participation in the interbank market a¤ects, respectively, bank capital, changes in bank capital, dividends and changes in dividends. Section 6 presents the data we used to test the model's predictions and the results of our regressions. Sections 7 concludes. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
The Model
The basic model is similar to Gale [15] , and provides a rationale for the use of bank capital based on risk sharing. Consider a three-date economy (t = 0; 1; 2) with a single good available at each date for both consumption and investment. There are two assets: a short-term or liquid asset which matures in one period with a return of one, and a longterm or illiquid asset which requires two periods to mature and delivers a return R > 1. The short asset represents a storage technology (one unit of the good invested at t = 0; 1 produces one unit at t+1), while the long asset captures long-term productive opportunities (one unit invested at t = 0 produces R units at t = 2, and nothing at t = 1). Clearly, the choice of a portfolio of assets re ‡ects a trade-o¤ between returns and liquidity.
There are two regions i = A; B in the economy, and each region is populated by two groups of agents. The …rst group is a continuum of risk-neutral agents that we call investors. They are endowed with a large amount of the consumption good at t = 0 and nothing at t = 1; 2. Investors cannot consume a negative amount at any time, and their utility is
where c t 0, and > R.
The second group is given by a unitary mass of risk-averse agents that we call depositors. They are endowed with 1 unit of the consumption good at t = 0, and nothing at t = 1; 2. Following Diamond and Dybvig [8] , depositors can be of two types, early consumers who only value consumption at t = 1, or late consumers who only value consumption at t = 2. The type of an agent is not known at t = 0. When consumption is valuable, the agent's utility is u(c), where u : R + ! R is continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and concave, and satis…es the Inada condition lim c!0 u 0 (c) = 1.
The uncertainty about the preference shocks for the second group of agents is resolved in period 1 as follows. First, a regional liquidity shock is realized, which determines the fraction ! i of early consumers in each region i = A; B. Then, preference shocks are randomly assigned to the consumers in each region so that ! i agents become early consumer.
The preference shock is privately observed by the consumer, while the regional shocks ! i are publicly observed. The regional shock ! i takes the two values ! H and ! L , with ! H > ! L , with equal probability 1=2. Therefore, the expected value of the regional shock is
The economy is characterized by four possible states of the world S 2 S = fHH; LH; HL; LLg.
In states HH and LL the two regions are hit by identical shocks while in states LH and HL they are hit by di¤erent shocks. To allow for various degrees of correlation between regional shocks, we assume that the probability that the two regions are hit by di¤erent shocks is p 2 (0; 1). A higher value of the parameter p implies a lower correlation between regional shocks and more scope for interregional risk sharing. A simple baseline case is when the regional shocks are independent and p = 1=2. Table 1 summarizes the probability distribution of the liquidity shocks. 
Agents cannot trade directly with one another, but there is a banking sector in the economy which makes up for the missing markets. Banks within the same regions are perfectly homogeneous and they collectively behave as a representative bank whose activity develops as follows. At t = 0 the representative bank (or simply the bank) collects the initial endowment of the depositors and an amount e 0 of resources from the investors. Therefore, the amount e will henceforth be referred to as bank capital. The bank invests an amount y in the short asset and an amount 1 + e y in the long asset; then, in period 1, after the aggregate shock S is publicly observed, the consumer reveals his preference shock to the bank and receives the consumption vector c As in Allen and Gale (2000) we use a spatial metaphor to capture the existence of different groups of banks with di¤erent liquidity needs. Each region could correspond to a speci…c bank, a geographical region, a speci…c banking sector, etc. For our purposes, the economy represents a set of banks connected through an interbank market (to be explicitly introduced in section 4) together with their depositors and investors. In this sense, the parameter p represents a measure of the deepness of the interbank market, as it gives the probability of …nding a bank with di¤erent liquidity needs to, potentially, trade with.
In what follows we are interested in studying the e¤ects of the interbank market on the incentives to hold bank capital. Since our focus will be on an interbank market able to decentralize the …rst-best allocation, we start in the next section to characterize optimal risk sharing and we will introduce the interbank market in section 4.
Optimal Risk Sharing
In this section we abstract from the interbank market and consider the problem faced by a planner that chooses an allocation to maximize the sum of ex-ante expected utilities of depositors, maintaining investors at their reservation utility (i.e., the utility they can obtain by consuming their endowment at t = 0). The planner is unable to observe the preference shock of individual depositors but can observe regional liquidity shocks. Notice that aggregate liquidity needs in the economy are the same in states HL and LH, and it is therefore optimal for the planner to move resources from one region to the other to make the agents consumption plans constant in this case (i.e., c 
The …rst two constraints guarantee that there are enough resources at t = 1 and t = 2. respectively, to deliver the planned amount of consumption in each state s. Whenever y ! s c s 1 d s 1 > 0 we say that there is positive rollover in state s, that is some resources are stored through the liquid asset between t = 1 and t = 2. In this case the ex-post social value of liquidity is clearly the lowest possible as it exceeds the needs in the economy. The third constraint guarantees that investors get at least their reservation utility. 3 The planner's problem is therefore to choose a feasible allocation to maximize
Without loss of generality, we can assume that d 
the excess demand can be cleared up with and excess supply at t = 1. At t = 2, resources move in the opposite direction in state M to clear up the regional excess demand and excess supply, while in states H and L each region can satisfy its own demand with its own resources.
Interbank Deposit Market
Consider now the decentralized economy in which the representative bank in each region o¤ers a risk-sharing contract to its depositors and investors. We would like to know whether optimal risk sharing can also be achieved in this case. In the decentralized economy an allocation can only be achieved if it is feasible within each region considered separately. The …rst-best consumption levels would not entail any feasibility problem in states H and L as, in this case, the regional demand for consumption can be entirely satis…ed using internal resources. 4 However, in state M both at t = 1 and t = 2, one region has an excess demand for consumption while the other region has an excess supply of exactly the same amount. One way to overcome this problem is to allow banks to exchange deposits at t = 0. To verify if this is feasible, assume that each bank o¤ers the …rst-best allocation and that the 4 Notice that the …rst-best allocation assigns a contingent consumption stream to the agents in each region. In state H both regions have a large fraction of early consumers but there is no liquidity shortage as the promised level of consumption in this case, c H 1 , is the lowest possible (see proposition 1). We also allow for contingent consumption plans in the decentralized economy and we therefore abstract from problems of …nancial distress and default. In any case, the state H represents a situation of economic distress at t = 1, with a strong pressure for immediate consumption, which however …nds a frictionless (and e¢ cient) solution in a reduction of per-capita consumption levels. bank in a given region deposits the amount ! H ! M with the bank in the other region at the same conditions applied to individual depositors. This means that when the fraction of early consumers in region i is ! H the corresponding bank will behave as an early consumer and will withdraw its deposit at t = 1. In this case the bank obtains nothing at t = 2,
if the fraction of early consumers in the other region is ! L (i.e., if the state is M ), and (! H ! M ) c H 1 otherwise (i.e., if the state is H). If the fraction of early consumers in region i is ! L , the corresponding bank will behave as a late consumer by holding its deposit until t = 2, when it will …nally withdraw it. In this case the bank obtains zero at t = 1 while at t = 2 it gets (! H ! M ) c M 2 if the fraction of early consumers in the other region is ! H (i.e., if the state is M ), and
if the state is L).
We can now verify that the …rst-best allocation is feasible in the decentralized economy with interbank markets. To this end, notice that at t = 0 the net ‡ow of funds between the two banks is zero so that the …rst-best level of capital e and liquidity y are still compatible with the …rst-best level of investment in the long asset given by 1 + e y. Thereafter, at t = 1 in states H and L the two banks withdraw their deposits at the same time so that the net ‡ow of funds between regions is zero at both t = 1 and t = 2. First-best consumption levels are feasible within each region in states H and L and will therefore remain so also in the presence of interbank deposits markets. In state M the two regions receive asymmetric liquidity shocks so that one region will withdraw its interbank deposit at t = 1 (the region with the high shock), while the other will withdraw at t = 2 (the region with the low shock). For concreteness, let A be the region with the high liquidity shock. In this case in both regions the amount of the short asset at t = 1 is y
to cover its withdrawals at t = 1. The bank in region A redeems its interbank deposit at t = 1; receives the amount (! H ! M ) c M 1 . Therefore it is able to satisfy its budget constraint:
The bank in region B faces withdrawals from both its depositors and from the bank in region A for a total amount of
However, it is also able to satisfy its budget constraint:
Budget constraints are also satis…ed at t = 2; and the case in which region B receives the high liquidity shock is treated in a similar way. Let
denote the amount that banks can withdraw at t = 1 and at t = 2, respectively. Table 2 below summarizes the net ‡ow of funds between banks, as well as their net interbank positions, denoted by t at time t, in di¤erent states of the world. A bank net position is positive when it is a net borrower (a debtor), and negative when it is a net lender (a creditor). 5 Notice that the interbank net position can only be di¤erent from zero at t = 1. Indeed, interbank deposits capture a market for liquidity at t = 1 and we will mainly refer to 1 in what follows. 
HH H
In this section we further characterize the …rst-best allocation and we study how both bank capital and interbank deposit markets play a role in achieving the optimal risk sharing. In a nutshell, interbank markets can only work when bank liquidity needs are uncorrelated, that is in state M , but are of little help when banks are hit by the same liquidity shock. The existence of aggregate uncertainty on bank liquidity needs (i.e., the possibility of liquidity shocks that cannot be diversi…ed away through the interbank market) creates a scope for bank capital. In fact, by raising bank capital part of this undiversi…able risk can be transferred to the risk-neutral investors at a cost . We have Proposition 1 Assume p < 1 and consider the …rst-best allocation. If e > 0, there are two possible cases:
In this case we have
Moreover, c
is not possible and positive rollover can occur: (i) in states L and M , in which case c
and positive rollover can only occur in state L, in which case c
This result is proved in the appendix and clari…es that the uncertainty about aggregate liquidity needs makes it impossible for banks to o¤er full insurance to risk-averse depositors. In particular, …rst-period (second-period) consumption tends to decrease (increase) with the aggregate fraction of early consumers. The risk-neutral investors can bear the aggregate uncertainty more e¢ ciently, and banks can partially transfer it to them by collecting part of their resources at t = 0, in the form of bank capital, in exchange for a stochastic dividend at t = 2. The optimal way of arranging this form of risk sharing is to never pay a dividend in the state in which the marginal utility of late consumers is higher, that is in state L. However, it can be optimal to pay a positive dividend both in states H and M in which case second period consumption is constant across such states. To have an intuition of why banks do not want to raise enough capital as to completely insure their depositors, notice that when c
, the marginal value of insurance is zero. However, the marginal cost of capital is positive, as investors incur a marginal cost > R in deferring their consumption to period two (see Allen and Gale [4] ). The following result provides a su¢ cient condition guaranteeing that only case 1) in Proposition 1 is possible.
Proposition 2 Assume R close to one, then banks pay a dividend only in state H, that is, only case 1 in Proposition 1 is possible.
The intuition is that, when R is su¢ ciently close to 1 there is rollover both in states L and M . This directly implies that case 2 in Proposition 1 cannot occur (since in that case rollover happens only in state L). To conclude this section notice that we cannot exclude that the …rst-best level of capital is zero. This trivial case emerges if is too large and bank capital becomes too costly to be used for risk-sharing purposes. In what follows we therefore abstracts from this case.
Bank Capital
The optimal amount of bank capital clearly depends on the scope of the interbank market as measured by p. Let us use the notation e(p) to make this relationship explicit. The pa-rameter p can be interpreted in a variety of ways. (1) At the level of a single bank, p re ‡ects the degree of connectedness to the overall interbank network; (2) At the country level, p is a¤ected by the external position of the banking system; (3) at the level of the overall economy, it re ‡ects the relative importance of regional (and diversi…able) shocks versus systemic shocks. Intuitively, if p increases, the interbank market can be used more often to smooth the liquidity shocks and, as a consequence, the incentive to raise bank capital should be smaller. This intuition is indeed correct when we consider the extreme case of p = 1. In this case an allocation can be simply thought of as an array y; e; c
as whatever happens in states H and L has zero probability and is therefore irrelevant. In this case, the optimal allocation has e 0, d
subject to
Notice that (6)- (8) must all bind at the solution, and it is possible to verify that the …rst order conditions imply
with equality if e > 0. Clearly (9) can never be zero which means that in this case we necessarily have e = 0. Hence, with no aggregate uncertainty, the interbank market is su¢ cient to smooth away liquidity shocks, and there is no need for bank capital. By using a continuity argument it is also clear that if p 0 > p and p 0 is su¢ ciently close to one, whenever e(p) > 0 we also have e(p 0 ) < e(p). In other words, whenever there is some scope for bank capital for risk-sharing purposes, a substantial reduction in aggregate uncertainty also reduces the optimal level of bank capital. Notice that the use of bank capital reduces the volatility of second-period consumption by a factor of 2. In this example R is relatively high which implies that case 2 in Proposition 1 is possible (and indeed a dividend is paid also in state M ). The negative relationship between the level of bank capital and p is not a general property of the model though. Indeed, Castiglionesi et al., [6] show that under general conditions small increases in p can induce higher consumption volatility due to a reduction in the bank liquidity ratio. The same e¤ect shows up in this case and can induce banks to increase their amount of bank capital when p increases, provided that it remains below some threshold. Figure 2 shows a numerical example with R = 1:3, = 1:4, ! H = 0:8, ! L = 0:2, and in which depositors have constant relative risk aversion = 2. From panel (a) we can see that bank capital is indeed slightly increasing until about p = 0:4 and decreasing thereafter. Panel (b) shows that in this case a dividend is only paid in state H (the value of R is lower than in the previous example). Finally, panel (c) shows the secondperiod consumption volatility both with (right scale) and without (left scale) bank capital. Notice that in the absence of bank capital, the consumption volatility would increase with p, for values of p below some critical level which is about 0:75 in this example. However, if banks can raise capital, as long as p remains below 0:4 in this example, the optimal level of capital is increasing in p. Bank capital is used to smooth the increased volatility of second period consumption that would be brought about by the reduced liquidity ratio. Indeed, second period consumption volatility is everywhere decreasing in p when bank capital is allowed.
Bank Capital and Interbank Markets
The relationship between bank capital and p is intuitive but is not very appealing as a testable empirical prediction due to the unobservability of p. However, the value of p also a¤ects the activity on the interbank market which is captured by 1 , the net interbank position at t = 1. Notice, however, that we are mainly interested in measuring to what extent the interbank market is able to provide liquidity insurance. In this sense, it does not matter whether 1 is positive or negative (i.e., whether a bank is a lender or a borrower), and we can take the quantity E j 1 j = pm 1 , as a measure of interbank activity. 6 Intuitively, when p is large a bank tends to hold a small amount of capital, be more active on the interbank market and, as a consequence, its expected net interbank position, measured in absolute value, tends to be larger. The opposite happens for a low value of p. This relationship is straightforward if we compare the extreme cases of p = 1 and p = 0. With p = 1 bank capital is zero and the expected net interbank position is positive, while for p = 0 bank capital is positive and the expected net interbank position is zero. By a continuity argument, the same insight holds if we compare values of p close to one with values of p close to zero. Hence, at least in this extreme case, the model points toward a negative relationship between the level of bank capital and the absolute value of the interbank net position which will be tested in section 6. Notice, however, that the model fails to deliver a general prediction because the level of bank capital can be increasing in p and, therefore, it can also positively correlate with the net interbank position. Moreover, other considerations (like moral hazard or signaling) might a¤ect the relationship between bank capital and interbank participation in a sensitive and non trivial way. We clearly abstract from these factors in the model, focusing on the risk sharing role of bank capital, but they can of course be relevant in the data. The following section develops a further prediction of the model on the relationship between changes in bank capital and the net position on the interbank market.
Changes in Bank Capital and Interbank Markets
Bank capital can be thought of as the value to investors of (expected) future dividends, and it clearly corresponds to e at t = 0. However, after the observation of the state s at t = 1, the uncertainty about future dividends is completely resolved, and the value of bank capital equals the dividend to be paid at t = 2 in the observed state. In this sense, the state s determines the change in bank capital between t = 0 and t = 1, which will be denoted by Cap. Notice that the state s also determines banks net position on the interbank market (see Table 2 ). Table 3 displays the net position on the interbank market at t = 1 in absolute value j 1 j together with the value of the changes in bank capital Cap, both variables as a function of the state. Since the net position on the interbank market is in absolute value, the distinction between region A and B is immaterial. 
We are interested in whether the change in bank capital is larger or smaller when banks participate in the interbank market, that is, we look at the sign of
From
A result similar to Proposition 1 holds also in this case and, in particular, we still have
7 A negative sign for would therefore obtain more generally for a su¢ ciently large value of q. Hence, an alternative su¢ cient condition for < 0 is that q is su¢ ciently large, as in this case the probability of the state L is small, and its impact is negligible.
Dividend Payouts and Interbank Markets
A general insight presented in this paper is that if bank capital is used for risk-sharing purposes, dividends should not be paid in states of the world where the marginal utility of depositors is high. This insight implies that allowing for early dividend payouts (i.e., dividends paid at t = 1), we should not expect to observe an early dividend in state H. In fact, because of low consumption levels, the marginal utility of early consumers is high in this case, and subtracting further resources to pay an early dividend would have a large cost. However, we could possibly observe early dividends paid in states L and M . A simple way of making dividends appealing also at t = 1 is to assume that investors prefer 7 More precisely, with Pr fs = H j s 6 = M g = q, proposition 1 holds more generally with d H = e=q(1 p)
in case 1). The entire analysis still holds in the more general case, with the caveat that when q 6 = 1=2 the uncertainty on aggregate liquidity needs decreases in p only beyond some threshold. For example with q = 1, aggregate uncertainty (as measured for example by the variance of the aggregate liquidity shocks described in table 1) is clearly absent when p = 0 (the only possible state is HH in this case). Hence, when p increases, so does aggregate uncertainty till it eventually reaches a maximum, and decreases thereafter.
to consume at t = 1 than at t = 2. Formally, assume that the utility of the risk neutral investors is given by
with 0 > R > 1 > 1.
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An interesting case is with q = 1, that is state L is irrelevant, an early dividend paid in state M , but not in H, and a late dividend paid in H, but not in M . This is what happens in the numerical example shown in Figure 3 , which assumes 0 = 2 and 1 = 1:75. Other parameters are as in the example of Figure 1 , that is, R = 1:8, = 2, ! H = 0:6, ! Table 4 summarizes the characteristics of the dividend stream in the example of Figure  3 , and it relates dividend payouts to the position on the interbank market. Two predictions emerge: The net position in the interbank market at t = 1, can have (1) a positive relationship with the dividend paid at t = 1, and (2) a negative relationship with the change in dividends between t = 2 and t = 1. Figure 3 also shows that the prediction of a negative relationship between changes in bank capital and participation in the interbank market is robust to the payments of early dividends. In fact, with no early dividends, the change in bank capital described in table 3 is entirely driven by an information e¤ect. Now, a dividend paid at t = 1 has the e¤ect of reducing the value of capital, in this case for an accounting rather than an information e¤ect. Hence, in the example of Figure 3 , the change in bank capital is larger in H, when market participation is low, than in M , when market participation is high.
To conclude, the insight that can be derived if we think of bank capital as a way to insure risk-averse depositors against their liquidity shocks, is that because interbank markets play a similar role, we should expect the participation in such markets to act as a substitute for the use of bank capital. Hence, the level of participation to the interbank market (as measured for example by the absolute value of the interbank net position) should have a negative relationship with (1) the level of bank capital, and (2) the changes in bank capital (driven by both accounting based or information based e¤ects). Moreover, the participation in the interbank market should correlate (1) positively with the level of dividend payouts, and (2) negatively with the change in dividends. With these predictions at hand we now turn to the empirical section.
Empirical Analysis

Data
The interbank market is an Over the Counter market and its volume is not publicly available. The only public information about this market refers to the interbank borrowing and lending rates, that are collected by central banks from di¤erent samples of banks and for di¤erent currencies. 9 In particular, this market refers to the borrowing and lending of unsecured funds among banks in the London wholesale money market.
A database that provides a proxy for the volume on this market is Bankscope. This database has information on the amounts a bank lends to, and borrows from other banks. This information comes from banks balance-sheet and has a yearly frequency. This means that it neither allows to observe all the interbank ‡ows throughout the year, nor it allows to distinguish interbank loans of di¤erent maturities, or the positions toward di¤erent banks. Nonetheless it gives a picture of the overall position a bank has vis-a-vis other banks at the time of the balance-sheet closure, that we take as a proxy of the interbank participation during the year. We select banks with total assets greater than $1 billions (book value) from the EU, UK, and Japan for the period of 2005 till 2008.
We perform all our analysis including data until August 2008 because we would like to avoid that some of our results are driven by the Lehman e¤ect. Nevertheless, we perform robustness checks including the rest of 2008 for all our regressions, and we report the statistics on the variable of main interest in the corresponding footnotes.
US banks are not part of the sample because their participation in the interbank market is very limited. In fact most US banks do not hold unsecured deposits because of the high fees charged by the FDIC, but they participate in the Fed-Funds money market. This market is characterized by uncollateralized loans of reserve balances at the Federal Reserve banks. US banks and other depository institutions keep reserves at the Federal Reserve banks to meet reserve requirements and to clear …nancial transactions. The characteristics of this market are di¤erent from the London interbank market and, therefore, we choose to concentrate our analysis only on European and Japanese banks.
Our model relates interbank market participation to bank capital. In order to measure the exposure to the interbank market we take the di¤erence of what a given bank lends and borrows from other banks. We use the absolute value of this di¤erence, normalized by total assets, as a measure of risk sharing provided by the interbank market. We are rather interested in the exposure to the interbank market than in the question of whether a bank is a net lender or borrower.
We use a broad de…nition of bank capital that includes equity and reserves as well as subordinated debt and hybrid capital. Our model does not capture all the peculiarities and the di¤erent roles that bank capital may have, but instead focuses on its role as a bu¤er against liquidity shocks. For this reason any source of funding with a long maturity and no collateral could be considered a good proxy for the capital variable included in our model. We consider book value and not market value of bank capital because in our framework capital plays a liquidity bu¤er role. In contrast, market capital is a forward looking measure related to future pro…tability and market condition rather than simply a liquidity bu¤er.
We exclude from the sample the banks that do not report interbank market information or total capital. Besides the variables of main interest, we also include a series of balancesheets variables as control variables such as the amount of loan outstanding, the amount of residential mortgages, the amount of deposits, loan losses provisions as well as the return on asset, net income, facilities at the central banks, and bank assets.
Results
We report descriptive statistics of the sample of banks we considered, i.e., those banks that report both their position in the interbank market and the level of total capital. Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for the variables we use. The mean total book assets is $8,69 billion and the median is $5,58 billion. The sample exhibits considerable heterogeneity in the cross-section. The largest bank in the sample is almost 6,000 times of the size of the smallest. The banks'interbank position (measured by the absolute value of the di¤erence of their lent and borrowed amount) is on average 9.80% of total assets with a median of 4.60%, but the dispersion is rather signi…cant. The same applies to bank capital. On average it is equal to 9.10% but the standard deviation is 9.70%. Deposits are on average 59.70% and loans are 63.70% of total assets. Residential mortgages account for a low percentage over total assets (3.5%), which is largely due to the underreporting of this variable in the data base.
[TABLE 5]
The sample exhibits considerable heterogeneity in the time series and in the crosssection as Tables 6 and 7 show.
In Table 6 we report selected descriptive statistics on banks'interbank position (measured by the absolute value of the di¤erence of their lent and borrowed amount), bank capital, change in bank capital from one period to the other, and other banks characteris- Table 6 shows that over our sample period, the highest participation in the interbank market occurs in 2006. In that year the average position of the banks in our sample is 10.44% of total assets. In 2007 we observe a small reduction of 0.07% and in 2008 a drastic reduction of -3.42%. The reduction we observed for the sample from January to August 2008 is largely due to the fact that mostly Japanese banks close their balance sheets in this period. Banks from the other countries usually close their balance sheets at the end of the year.
The composition of banks balance-sheets also shows changes over time. Capital and pro…t measures almost always decrease throughout the sample period. At the same time, we see an increase in the amount of deposits held by banks. Loans over total assets remain fairly stable, while show a modest decrease in 2008.
[ Table 6 provides statistics on the time-series dynamics of bank participation in the interbank market and of the other variables we use in our analysis. However, our sample displays variations also at the cross-sectional level indicating heterogeneity among banks. This feature is highlighted in Table 7 that illustrates how the participation in the interbank market di¤ers across banks with di¤erent assets size. We de…ne four categories according to the size of total assets: from 1 to 20 billion USD (small), from 20 to 100 billion (medium), from 100 to 200 billion (large) and above 200 billion (extra-large). The average participation in the interbank market varies with the size of the banks. Loosely speaking, smaller banks (with total assets worth less than 100 billion) have on average a net position of about 10%, while for the larger banks (with total assets above 100 billions) this number is about 8%. The composition of the balance sheet also seems to be rather di¤erent among the four categories. Small banks have a large part of their total asset invested in loans, hold larger loan-loss reserves, a larger amount of capital as well as a larger amount of deposits.
[ 
Regression Analysis
The theoretical model presented in the previous section provides three testable implications. First, banks choose to hold a higher level of capital if they expect to participate little in the interbank market. Second, banks delay paying dividends to shareholders when the interbank market is less able to provide liquidity insurance as a consequence of banks facing common shocks. Hence, both changes in bank capital and changes in dividends should be negatively related to participation in the interbank market. Third, the level of dividend paid should be positively related to interbank market participation.
We start by investigating the empirical relationship between a bank's interbank market position and its level of capital. There could be many factors a¤ecting the exposure of a bank in the interbank market.
We are not able to directly measure neither the demand nor the supply of funds. However, we try to control for variables that, by a¤ecting either the demand or the supply side, in ‡uence the observed interbank market position. On the demand side, a larger loan portfolio may result in a larger need to borrow in the interbank market, while a larger deposit base reduces the need to participate in the interbank market. On the supply side, a larger loan portfolio may render the borrower more risky, hence it may result in lower supply of funds. Similarly, higher loan losses provisions and lower net interest margins re ‡ect higher risk and therefore may reduce the supply of available funds. On the contrary, return on asset represents the pro…tability of the bank and therefore the ability of the bank to pay back its debt. The need and the role a bank may have in the interbank market could be also related to the size of the bank. For this reason we control for this e¤ect. We also consider facilities by the central banks that could provide another potential source of liquidity bu¤er.
Hypothesis 1: Banks capital holding is negatively related to their interbank market participation
We perform a robust standard error panel regression where we take as dependent variable the interbank market exposure of banks in each period, and regress it on the level of capital of the previous period. As a measure of interbank market participation, we use the absolute value of the di¤erence between the amount lent and borrowed from other banks over total bank assets. The control variables are loans on total assets, residential mortgages over total assets, facility from the Central Bank over total assets, measures of risk, such as loan loss provisions and loan loss reserves both on total assets, the return on assets, and bank size measured by the logarithm of total asset. We also include yearly and country dummy variables. Table 8 shows that the relation between interbank market participation and the lagged value of bank capital is negative and highly signi…cant. Hence, there seems to be a strong substitution e¤ect between bank capital and interbank market participation. Besides the main variables of interest, some of the instrumental variables are also signi…cant. Loans over total assets is signi…cant and with a negative sign, indicating that more risky banks participate less in the interbank market. The same e¤ect is con…rmed for the variable residential mortgage. The coe¢ cient of the return on asset is also signi…cant with a positive sign, meaning that more pro…table banks participate with a larger position in the interbank market. The size variable is also signi…cant and negative. This result could be explained by the fact that large banks mostly play the role of collecting money and distributing them in the market rather than directly providing insurance in the interbank market. Among the country dummies, only the one for Japan is signi…cant indicating that, on average, the level of participation of these banks in the interbank market is lower than the one of banks in other countries 1011 . 10 Given that residential mortgages is a variable that has been under-reported in the Bankscope dataset,
we have repeated the panel regression without including this variable and the results are qualitatively the same: the signi…cance and the sign of all the other variables remains the same and the negative relatioshinship between interbank participation and lagged capital is con…rmed. 11 These results are robust when extending the period considered until the end of 2008. Lagged bank capital is still largely signi…cant with a coe¢ cient equal to -0.107. Results are provided upon request.
[
TABLE 8]
Hypothesis 2: Bank capital changes and dividend changes are both negatively related to the interbank market participation.
The second prediction of our theoretical model is that changes in bank capital are in ‡uenced by the level of participation in the interbank market. In our setup the change in bank capital is a result of a change in expectation over future dividends upon the realization of the state, and we therefore also look at a measure of dividend payments. Hence, a similar relationship to changes in bank capital can be obtained between dividend changes and interbank market exposure. Notice that in our analysis we used a broad de…nition of bank capital that includes also hybrid capital and subordinated debt. The theoretical model introduced in section 2 does not distinguish between these di¤erent sources of bank capital, but clearly refers to a broad notion of capital as a liquidity bu¤er. The consequence is that what we called "dividend payments" in the theory section, indeed refers to the remuneration of all of the di¤erent sources of bank capital. Unfortunately, we do not have data on the remuneration of hybrid capital or subordinated debt, but we expect them to vary less than cash disbursements to equity holders. For this reason, in the following regressions we just use dividends, in the standard sense of cash distribution to equity holders, and we divide them by net income as a normalization.
Our model suggests that when the interbank market is unable to provide coinsurance, because of highly correlated liquidity shocks, the marginal utility of capital becomes high. As a consequence, no dividend is paid in this state of the world, and compensation for holding bank capital is postponed in the form of higher future dividends. On the contrary, in states of the world when the interbank market works well, i.e., it is able to provide coinsurance against regional liquidity shocks, the marginal value of capital is relatively low. Shareholders can be immediately rewarded with a dividend payment, and will therefore receive smaller payouts in the future. Hence, the di¤erence between current and future dividends should be less pronounced, or even turn negative.
As for bank capital, the model suggests that its value should increase when the interbank market does not work well, and should instead decrease (or increase by a smaller amount) when the interbank market is able to provide some coinsurance. Hence, the relationship between interbank market participation and changes in bank capital is predicted to be negative.
The prediction between the change in the level of capital and interbank market participation is hard empirically to investigate because many factors can lead to a change in the level of capital. In our regression we therefore include variables that may a¤ect the bank incentives to hold capital (i.e., loans loss reserve over total assets, loan loss provisions over total assets and net income over total assets). As shown above, interbank market participation is an endogenous variable and therefore we instrument it with the most signi…cant variables used in the …rst regression. Table 9 reports the results and shows that the change in bank capital is negatively related to the instrumented values of bank participation in the interbank market, in line with our theoretical model. Some of the control variables included in the regression are also signi…cant.
[TABLE 9]
The Loans Loss Reserve has a positive sign as well as the return on assets. The interpretation of the …rst relation could be that banks increase capital by increasing reserves for loan losses; the second relationship says that more pro…table banks increase capital by a larger amount. To consider the relationship between dividends and interbank market participation, we …rstly run a similar regression as in table 9, but we take as dependent variable the change in dividend payouts from one year to the other. As above, interbank market participation has been instrumented with the most signi…cant variables presented in the …rst regression. Table 10 reports the results, and shows that also the change in dividend payouts is negatively related to the instrumented values of bank participation in the interbank market. Some of the control variables included in the regression are also signi…cant. Deposits over total asset is signi…cant and negative, indicating that the change in dividend payment is lower if the bank is holding a large amount of deposits. The same applies if the level of capital at the beginning of the year is large. Central Banks facilities also induce banks to change less their dividends. Moreover, larger banks measured in terms of total assets tend to change less their dividend payment. 12 Considering the entire year of 2008, instrumented interbank market participation is still largely significant with a coe¢ cient equal to -0.022. Results are provided upon request. 13 Extending the time series until the end of 2008 does not changes the results. The instrumented interbank market participation is still largely signi…cant with a coe¢ cient equal to -1.066. Results are provided upon request.
TABLE 10]
Hypothesis 3: Dividend payouts are positively related to the interbank market participation.
In the analysis performed above we show that change in bank capital has a negative relationship with the absolute value of the interbank net position. Bank capital may change due to many di¤erent forces, such as larger or lower dividend payment as well as bank recapitalization. In the model we concentrate on dividend payment. Hence, we empirically look at the relationship between the absolute value of the interbank net position and dividend payout. Results are shown in table 11. Dividend payouts are positively related to the instrumented values of bank participation in the interbank market. The relationship is signi…cant at 1.5% level. Therefore, as suggested by our model, if bank capital is used for risk-sharing purposes, banks should pay less dividends (banks should avoid to distribute income) when the participation in the interbank market is low. Some of the control variables included in the regression are also signi…cant. Loans over total asset is signi…cant and positive, but the lagged level of capital is not relevant for dividend payment. Size is signi…cant and positive indicating that dividend payment is larger for large banks. Yearly dummies are signi…cant with a negative sign indicating that banks in 2006 and 2007 pay a lower percentage of dividend over net income. Country dummy variables are not signi…cant, with the exception of Japan, that on average pays a larger percentage of dividend over net income compared to other banks in the sample.
[TABLE 11]
Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed a model of multiple banking to study how interbank market participation a¤ects the incentives to hold bank capital for risk-sharing purposes. We show under which conditions a negative relationship exists between bank participation in the interbank market and bank capital. The model also predicts a negative relationship between changes in bank capital and interbank participation as well as changes in dividend and interbank market participation. Furthermore, we …nd a positive relationship between the level of dividends and interbank participation. We use Bankscope dataset to verify if the model's prediction were empirically validated, and we found strong support to all of them.
Appendix
To simplify the exposition it is useful to determine optimal levels of consumption for assigned values of y and e when the fraction of early consumers is ! and the corresponding dividend paid to investors at t = 2 is d. Formally, given (y; e; d; !) with y 2 [0; 1 + e], ! 2 (0; 1), e 0 and (1 + e y)R > d 0, we consider the value function V (y; e; d; !) max and we denote with C t (y; e; d; !) the corresponding optimal consumption at t. Lemma 1 and 2 below summarize some important properties of the value function and the associated consumption policies.
Lemma 1
The value function V is strictly concave, continuous and di¤erentiable in (y; e; d) with
The policies C 1 and C 2 are given by . Now, the strict concavity of u implies that if 6 = 0 then also c 6 = c 0 and, therefore, the strict concavity of V follows from the strict concavity of u. Continuity follows from the theorem of the maximum, and di¤erentiability follows using concavity and a standard perturbation argument to …nd a di¤erentiable function which bounds V from below. To obtain (11) note that from the envelope theorem @V =@y = + (1 R) ;
where and are the Lagrange multipliers on the two constraints. The problem …rst order conditions are
which substituted in the previous expression give (11) . Expressions (12) and (13) are obtained similarly. Considering separately the cases > 0 (no rollover) and = 0 (rollover), it is then possible to derive the optimal policies.
Lemma 2 C 1 C 2 for all (y; e; d; !). In particular given b y = !(R(1+e) d)= (1 ! + !R), we distinguish two cases:
y there is rollover and we have
(ii) If y b y there is no rollover and we have
where the inequalities are strict if y < b y or otherwise hold as equalities.
Proof of Lemma2. The proof follows from inspection of C 1 and C 2 in Lemma 1.
Since C 1 C 2 late consumers never have an incentive to mimic early consumers. Clearly, the opposite is also true so that, even if consumers have private information on their preference shocks, incentive compatibility is not an issue here. An immediate consequence of Lemma 2 is the following corollary. 
The solution to the above problem provides the …rst-best values of y; e; and d S , while …rst-best consumption levels are given by
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume e > 0, and let and s be the Lagrange multipliers for (15) and (16) . Using Lemma 1 and noting that at the optimum c
The proof is now organized in three steps.
Step 1 shows that we always have d
Since e > 0, d s cannot be zero for all s.
They cannot all be strictly positive either, otherwise from (20), with s = 0 for all s, we obtain X 
Assuming d H = 0 we obtain a similar contradiction. For a similar reason it is impossible that d M > 0 and d H = 0. Therefore we only have two possible cases:
In both cases plugging (20) with
which together with (18) characterize the optimal values of y and e.
Step 2 establishes that positive rollover is possible in state s only if d s = 0.
Assume by contradiction that in state s we both have positive rollover and d s > 0.
From (20) Step 3 shows how consumption levels are ordered in cases 1) and 2) of the proposition. Notice that we can never have c
as, given (20) , this can only happen if H = M = L = 0, which is in turn incompatible with (19) . In case 1), i.e., d (ii) Rollover only in state L: From Lemma 2 we have
and since ! H > ! M > ! L , given Lemma 2 and (20) we obtain
(iii) No rollover in any state. From Lemma 2 and
In case 2), i.e., d Consider the limiting case with R = 1. It is possible to check that the solution to the planner's problem described in section 3 involves y w H , e = d s = 0, c s t = 1, for s = H; M; L; and t = 1; 2. Intuitively, in this case the short asset clearly dominates the long asset, and the tradeo¤ between returns and liquidity vanishes. The best that a risk-averse agent can obtain is to consume its unitary endowment at t = 1 if he turns out to be an early consumer, or at t = 2 otherwise. The best for the riskneutral investors is instead to consume their entire endowment when their marginal utility is highest, that is at t = 0. A planner can achieve this allocation by investing in the short asset a su¢ cient amount to cover the unitary per-capita demand of early consumer in state H, that is y ! H . This means that rollover is positive in states M and L (and also in state H if y > ! H ). Now, by a continuity argument, when R ! 1 from above the (unique) optimal allocation must converge to one of the optimal allocations for the case R = 1 (it can be seen that it converges to the allocation with y = ! H ), but this means that there will be some cuto¤ b R > 1 such that whenever R < b R, rollover is strictly positive in both states M and L. Proposition 1 then implies that no dividend can be paid in state M when R is su¢ ciently small. 
